The features Pinker associates with dignity, and even more so the examples he gives are indeed unappealing. Since I don't share Pinker's misgivings about dignity, it would seem that I must disagree with his characterization and reject his examples. But as a matter of fact, no such disagreement need exist. As it turns out, Pinker is talking about what he describes as a psychological concept of dignity:
Dignity is a phenomenon of human perception. Certain features in another human being trigger ascriptions of worth. These features include signs of composure, cleanliness, maturity, attractiveness, and control of the body. The perception of dignity in turn elicits a response in the perceiver. Just as the smell of baking bread triggers a desire to eat it, and the sight of a baby's face triggers a desire to protect it, the appearance of dignity triggers a desire to esteem and respect the dignified person.
Pinker juxtaposes this psychological notion of dignity with the distinctly moral ideal of respect for persons. 4 However, it is precisely the latter notion that many others identify with the concept of dignity. To assume that there is just one concept here, and then call it stupid or wise, is a trap we should be careful to avoid.
2. I will accordingly take the liberty of replacing the definite article in my assigned topic with the indefinite article, and speak not about the concept of dignity but about a concept of dignity. It stands for an affirmation of the equal, or perhaps rather unique, and supreme moral worth of every human being, an affirmation designed to play a foundational role in morality and by extension in law as well. Appropriate to this symposium and to the composition of this audience, the concept on which I focus is largely a Jewish-German co-production. Both the Jewish and the German origins of this concept of dignity (from now on the definite article only designates the concept that I discuss) are well known. On 4 P. 5.
2 the Jewish side this concept comes from the uplifting Biblical idea of imago Dei, or in the original Hebrew, b'tzelem Elohim: the claim that human beings were created in the image of God; whereas the most influential and philosophically astute modern source is in the writings of Immanuel Kant.
Tracing the concept of dignity to these two sources raises, however, some serious difficulties. One concerns the relationship between the sources. Kant himself does not couch his discussion of human dignity in the ancient imago Dei idiom. Though Kant professes religious beliefs, his moral theory is resolutely secular. His aim is to provide morality with a non-theistic foundation; grounding humanity's special moral worth on its resemblance to God would obviously defeat this aim. The two sources thus seem to be in tension rather than complementary or cooperative. Each source also raises problems of its own. As to imago Dei, many of those who pledge allegiance to human dignity do so within a secular liberal worldview; what possible interest can they take in Man's alleged resemblance to God? Kant's appeal to children of the Enlightenment is clearer; but here too we face a problem. Kant's own moral theory is grounded in a metaphysics that few contemporary normative Kantians espouse. It is the metaphysics of the thing-in-itself and relatedly of the noumenal self, whose freedom is a matter of wholesale exemption from laws of nature, which for this purpose comprise not just physics but what we ordinarily think of as psychology as well. The Kantianism absorbed into the liberal canon is a deracinated one, cut off from these metaphysical roots.
So it appears that not only are the sources of dignity we inherited, the religious and the metaphysical, at odds, but that neither is particularly appealing to us today. I will argue to the contrary that despite religious misgivings and metaphysical doubts, the two sources remain viable. Contemplating Kant's concept of dignity against the background of the imago Dei idea makes sense, and reveals a common ground that is hospitable to any nonbeliever humanist, anxious to uphold humanity's moral worth without the support of a divine warrant, while also staying away from the more esoteric aspects of a Kantian metaphysics. In what follows, I first discuss this common ground, and then point out some pitfalls.
3. I start by considering the imago Dei idea. To see its relevance to a secular sensibility, we should distinguish in it two different claims or moments. One, call it the creation thesis, is the belief that the world in general, and human beings in particular, are God's creation. The second, the resemblance thesis, holds that humanity resembles God. The first thesis does not distinguish humanity from the rest of creation; it is the latter claim that gives rise to human dignity. The resemblance can be interpreted in different ways, but one attractive theme sees it in terms of the knowledge of good and evil. It is in this respect in particular that humankind's resemblance to God is said to imply humanity's divine stature and so its special worth. Note, however, that though the creation thesis cannot be accepted by the secular mind, the resemblance thesis can. But how? If man was not created by God, whence the resemblance? And what is the resemblance a resemblance to?
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The key here lies in a tradition of thought, most famously associated with the German philosopher Ludwig Feuerbach, 5 which reverses the creation thesis. From a secular standpoint the crucial observation is that people have created God, and indeed created Him in their own image by projecting an idealized vision of themselves. We can appeal to this view to reinterpret the imago Dei idea. The cardinal difference between the religious standpoint and its secular reinterpretation is that humanity, which from the religious standpoint is the image, turns out to be the original, reflected in a mirror of its own creation. On this reinterpretation, the resemblance to God is there all right; the direction of fit is only different.
To be sure, the attributes projected unto God are contested and not always attractive. He, being not surprisingly male (given who got to be the dominant projectors) is sometimes depicted as belligerent, irritable, jealous, vain, and even with long facial hair. 6 Though this is unfortunate, as far as the derivation of human dignity is concerned, it is not a fatal flaw. The important thing in the imago Dei idea, is a formal point. Whatever God's alleged attributes, we know from the start that they represent the highest ideals. And so, the idea of God bespeaks a devotion to an ideal of perfection and a commitment to strive for the realization of its implications for one's life. To recognize that the source of the ideal lies in the believers and that they are the ultimate authority for the imperatives by which they live is to ascribe to them an uncontestable worth, commensurate with the value they themselves ascribe to the being they conceive. 5 Essence of Christianity, (1841) trans. M. Evans (George Eliot) 1854; new edition, intro. K. Barth, foreword H.R. Niebuhr, (New York: Harper & Row, 1957) . 6 With an apology to my bearded friends. 5 4. This reinterpretation or transposition of the imago Dei idea takes us straight to the heart of a Kantian account as well. 7 What Kant says in regard to human dignity is brief and merits quoting. Now I say that man, and in general every rational being, exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means for arbitrary use by this or that will… 8 In the kingdom of ends everything has either a price or a dignity. If it has a price, something else can be put in its place as an equivalent; if it is exalted above all price and so admits of no equivalent, then it has a dignity… Now morality is the only condition under which a rational being can be an end in himself; for only through this is it possible to be a lawmaking member in a kingdom of ends. Therefore morality, and humanity so far as it is capable of morality, is the only thing which has dignity… For nothing can have a value other than that determined for it by the law. But the law-making which determines all value must for this reason have a dignity -that is, an unconditioned and incomparable worth -for the appreciation of which , as necessarily given by a rational being, the word 'reverence' is the only becoming expression. 9
These are undeniably powerful assertions carrying great rhetorical force. But what's the argument here? We can distinguish in these quotations three points: the equivalence between the notion of dignity and that of being an end; the view of people as ends and hence the ascription of dignity to them; and the claim that ascribing to people this value is the core of morality. To elucidate Kant's concept of dignity requires that we understand these three claims and their interrelationship. Different accounts have been proposed, in 7 The derivation, or to use Kant's term, the deduction of human dignity that I sketch here is Kantian even if it is not quite Kant's. My assignment is not to contribute to Kant scholarship (I leave this to the experts) but to elucidate the concept of dignity. Kantian themes are indispensable tools; no less, but no more. Also, like many others, I appeal exclusively to Kant's moral theory, which is where he develops the idea of human dignity. Consequently, I ignore the difficulties that arise in translating this moral notion into political and legal terms. 8 Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, H. J. Patton, trans. (London: Hutchinson, 1948 , 1976 , p. 90. 9 Ibid., pp. 96-97. 6 part because there may have been more than one strand in Kant's own mind. Here I want to sketch a variant of one of these strands that I find attractive. 10 I call it the value of valuation.
The first step is Kant's insistence on human intelligibility. All human action makes sense, has a point; it is, to use another idiom, meaningful. What makes action intelligible, what
gives it meaning, is that it's done for the sake of something or other. That for the sake of which an action is taken is its end. But the same idea can also be expressed in the vocabulary of value. To act intelligibly requires that that for the sake of which one acts, the end, be deemed worth pursuing, and so valuable. In this sense all action consists in the projection and attempted realization of purported values. One goal of a theory of the practical domain is accordingly to account for the values we pursue. What Kant can be seen as offering in this regard is a theory of value centered around a binary division between two types of value: price and dignity. Roughly, price expresses the value of things for us, that is for persons; whereas dignity expresses our own value; it is the value of persons.
But this is too rough. The classification as well as the distinction between our own value and the value things have "for us" on which the classification depends must be clarified and refined. Starting with the classification of values, price is not a unitary value; Kant further distinguishes between market price and fancy price. Though he doesn't much elaborate this subdivision, commentators tend to associate the latter with esthetic value. 11
Kant accordingly distinguishes three kinds of value: pragmatic, aesthetic, and moral.
Building a house or a table are the realization of pragmatic value; listening to music, visiting the museum, taking a trip to the Grand Canyon, playing basket ball or soccer, are realizations of aesthetic value; keeping a promise, helping a blind person cross the street, visiting with a sick friend, are the realization of moral value.
It is also evident that all three kinds of value make a claim on us, have a certain force, though the nature of the claim or the force vary, forming a hierarchy. And this requires a clarification of what it means for something to have value for us. The italicized expression is ambiguous between (1) it serves our interests and satisfies our desires, and
(2) it is recognized as or deemed valuable by us. Now some of the things we value, those that possess what Kant labels market price, are valuable for us in the first sense. But others are not. We enjoy or admire the Mona Lisa or the Grand Canyon because of the value they possess; they are not valuable because of the satisfaction they provide. And this is true, even more emphatically, of moral values. We perceive them as having, in Kant's idiom, a categorical force, which is independent of our contingent needs, desires, and goals. Nevertheless, everything for the sake of which our actions are performed or toward which they are oriented, and so everything that is valuable, is valuable for us in the second sense: all the values we pursue, all the ends that make our actions, and more broadly our lives, meaningful, originate in us. The creation and appreciation of beauty, for example, is a matter of placing its objects, natural or man-made, within a network of concepts, ideas, and understandings, which are distinctly and exclusively ours. 12
Let me summarize. To be intelligible, we must pursue ends, and this is the same as projecting and realizing values. Since we must deem these values to be worth pursuing, we must endorse them. This is the sense in which in pursuing any value at all, we implicitly and inescapably view ourselves as the ultimate authority; we display deference to ourselves. And this is what I mean by the value of valuation. Dignity on this view is a second order value, or what we may call in Kantian terminology, a transcendental value, because it is the value that needs to be presupposed in order to validate all other values; or to put it in another way, human dignity is implicit in the very practice of value 13 : it must be presupposed in order to validate the status and significance that values commonly and inescapably have in human life.
As I said earlier, there are other ways, more or less faithful to Kant's text, of reaching this conclusion. Whatever the precise route leading to it, the conclusion is remarkable. One of Kant's great insights here is the idea that moral content can be derived from purely formal considerations. The very fact that we pursue any ends at all, and so have any values at all, quite apart from their content, attests to our own value, and so provides a foothold for a system of moral values designed to acknowledge this value and give 12 My use of the plural pronoun throughout is ambiguous between the collective meaning, referring to humanity as a whole (or to some intermediate collectivities such as cultures or groups), and the distributive meaning, referring each of us individually conceived, an ambiguity that covers over a large and difficult set of issues I do not address. 13 I borrow this expression from the title of a book by Joseph Raz (Oxford University Press, 2005) . 9 substance to this acknowledgement. This account gives morality a particularly secure position that other systems of value lack. All other values are in principle contestable. But as long as we contest them, we are committed to the validity of some value. And as long as we are committed to the existence of any value, we are committed to our own supreme value, as the origin, the authority, and the warrant of that value. 5. The increasing prominence of dignity-talk is often identified with or seen as part of what came to be called rights-discourse, but at least on the interpretation I've outlined it is more accurate to see the rise of dignity as having a different focal point and so as ushering in another discourse, a discourse of values. As a centerpiece in such discourse, the concept of dignity offers a platform on which secular humanism and religious humanism can meet, and a potentially mutually advantageous dialogue conducted.
But although it is possible to embrace the ideal of human dignity without the support of a religious warrant or Kantian metaphysics, those sources may not be easy to escape. A central cluster of issues to which I'd like to draw attention concerns the nature of the person whose dignity we assert. Dignity is the supreme worth of every human being, but what does that include? The scope of dignity must track the boundaries of the self; but where do these boundaries lie? When dignity mandates respect for persons, what is the precise target of this respect? The idea of "Human dignity" inevitably raises such pressing questions of human ontology. Extricating the concept of dignity from its religious and metaphysical origins, however, excludes the answers to these questions proffered by religious doctrine and by Kantian metaphysics, and so creates a gap. But unless we're careful, the very same religious and metaphysical ghosts we hope to exorcise may surreptitiously come to haunt us through this gap. Three specific pitfalls illustrate this wider theme; I label them, tendentiously, religious cooptation, choiceworship, and body-fetishism. I'll briefly discuss each.
By religious cooptation I refer to the possibility that religious doctrines be
inadvertently incorporated into what is supposed to be secular public discourse.
My main exhibit here is The Vatican's latest missive on the implications of human dignity, entitled The Instruction Dignitas Personae on Certain Bioethical Questions 14 .
Much of value can be garnered from this document, but not surprisingly the document is rife with distinctly Catholic doctrine unrelated to the idea of dignity. The danger is that this doctrine gets mixed up with the discussion of dignity, and so borrows the latter concept's prestige and rhetorical force to support policies that from a secular standpoint turn out to be inimical to human dignity. Consider, in this regard, the document's opening statement to the effect that "The dignity of a person must be recognized in every human being from conception to natural death," thus running together the affirmation of human dignity with a controversial ontological doctrine, namely that the human person who possesses that dignity begins at conception. In a similar vein, the document prohibits, again under the guise of a concern for human dignity, any fertility techniques seen as violating the distinctly religious doctrine that marital sex is the only permissible form of procreation. Doubts that choice as such, seen as the expression of the individual's will, is of moral value arise when we consider that to value choice is to give at least some positive valence and pay some respect to the will's determination to kill, or rape, or steal. A choice-liberal need not of course condone such choices: these choices violate other people's rights, rights that themselves can be seen as expressing or protecting these people's autonomy.
But invoking such countervailing considerations is an unsatisfactory response, in that it implies that the nefarious choices have some moral value, whereas they have none. The choice-liberal is committed to saying that qua a determination of a person's will any choice is pro tanto valuable. But our moral and legal judgments go the other way. That an act of homicide, or rape, or theft, represents the agent's considered choice and reflects a genuine determination of his will serves to aggravate the moral and legal severity of the action rather than mitigate it.
It will be said in response that the Kantian liberal I describe is a straw man. The more likely position held by liberals, Kantian or otherwise, is more qualified. They don't value just any choice, or for that matter all displays of autonomy; rather they deem choice or autonomy valuable only subject to a limiting generalizing proviso, i.e. when consistent with equal choice or equal autonomy for all. On this formulation, choices that strip others of their autonomy lack moral value from the start. But as an interpretation of the moral injunction to respect people, this restatement of the liberal position won't do for two reasons. First, the valorization of the will must be content independent: 17 to defer to people's wills is to defer to them as they are, no matter what their content. And as it turns out, the actual content of the will does not always abide by the strictures imposed by the egalitarian proviso. To insist that only choices respectful of others' autonomy have any value at all is to subject the will to an external evaluative standard, one that is patently at 17 Cf., Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford University Press, 1988) 35-37. 13 odds with ascribing to the will intrinsic value of its own. Second, the generalizing proviso does not apply to self-regarding choices, which are left unfettered. But at least within a Kantian framework, not all self-regarding choices are morally permissible. Kant maintains that one ought to respect not just others' humanity but one's own humanity as well. This gives rise to duties toward oneself, such as a prohibition against suicide. Since these self-regarding duties may impose constraints on the actual content of the will, they manifest a conflict between dignity and choice, a conflict which the generalizing proviso is unable to remove. 18 It is easy to see how these difficulties are avoided within Kant's metaphysics of the noumenal self. First, the will associated with this self is an idealized will, determined by the categorical imperative and in accordance with sound moral principles derived from it.
These principles, or maxims, are conceived of as already taking proper account of others' humanity as well as the agent's own, thus avoiding the problem presented by immoral choices, be they other-or self-regarding. Second, identifying on Kantian grounds respect for persons with respect for their will comports with the metaphysical identification of the noumenal self with a free, rational will. Outside of Kant's metaphysics, we must recognize that there is more to persons than their will, and correspondingly more to the idea of respecting a person than respecting her autonomy. We must be careful to distinguish here two different ideas: respecting a person's autonomy and respecting a person for or by virtue of her choices. 8. One way in which we, actual persons, differ from noumenal selves is that we are embodied. So one natural step toward a more comprehensive conception of the person that does not focus exclusively on the will involves recognizing the body as an aspect of persons pertinent to their dignity. But here too we are on slippery ontological grounds. A thin but important line separates the idea of respect for embodied persons from mere body-fetishism. Talk, both religious and secular, of the body's sanctity and inviolability often crosses this line. 19 There's a crucial difference between exploring the implications of people's embodiment for permissible and impermissible ways of treating them, and investing the body itself with moral value as a site of dignity and as worthy of respect.
To be sure, we often do attach value to bodies and their parts. Since I'm right handed my right hand is of greater value than my left. It also makes perfectly good sense to ascribe to, say, Cleopatra's nose greater, or lesser, beauty than to Caesar's. But notice that such pragmatic and esthetic valuations measure the body's value for us, in contrast to the kind of valuation the idea of dignity signifies, our own value. The suggestion that the body has dignity thus involves a category mistake. The value the body has for us does of course bear on how our own value ought to be protected and expressed, but the two, the body's value and our own, remain separate ideas that should not be confused.
It would help to avoid the confusion if we attend to the difference between our ordinary body-talk and our person-talk: not everything done to the body is also done under the same description to the person whose body it is. This is masked by cases in which the same verb describes both: to kick John's leg is to kick John; similarly with touching and injuring. However, to break John's leg is not to break John, and to pierce his ear is not to pierce him. These are trivial examples, and the disparity they reveal between talk of the body and of the person whose body it is, easily overcome: we incline to say that what was done to John in these cases is simply that his leg was broken, or his ear pierced. But in other cases this gap between bodily predicates and personal predicates is wider and not so readily bridged: touching the genitals may be molesting the person; pouring water on someone's head, baptizing him; tweaking someone's nose, insulting him. In these cases, we can attain to the normative significance of the respective actions only by replacing the bodily descriptions with such verbs as molesting, baptizing, or insulting, which pertain essentially and exclusively to persons, rather than to bodies. 
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In speaking of human self-creation Pico is of course not suggesting that human beings create their organism. The essence that on Pico's view humanity lacks whereas the rest of creation possesses is to be understood in teleological terms. We need not, however, subscribe to a teleological, Aristotelian worldview in order to be able to accept Pico's claim about humanity. Our essence or identity, the answer to the question what we are, is a matter of our pursuing projects, goals and, in the broadest sense, values. In other words, we are sites of meaning, and the meanings we create, create us.
But this by now should have a familiar ring. I have already implicitly adverted to some such picture of humanity in discussing Kant's notion of human intelligibility. What I called the value of valuation and the notion of human self-creation are two sides of the same coin, the denomination of which is humanity's moral worth. To see ourselves as the authors or originators of our values is perforce to see ourselves as self-creating as well.
And so what we ultimately appeal to when we make a judgment about such questions as what a body-affecting action amounts to by way of affecting the person is the meaning of that action, which is the meaning we give it. And as Pico helped us see, to mark the ontological void in which we operate and that we must fill is not to lament a handicap that vitiates the idea of dignity but is rather to identify the source of this idea and its habitat.
